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Introduction 
 
 
Border Security, Camps, Quotas: 
The Future of European Refugee Policy? 
Steffen Angenendt, David Kipp and Anne Koch 
On 18 March 2016, the EU member states and Turkey concluded an agreement on the 
return of persons having arrived in Greece irregularly – in the hope of reducing the 
number of irregular migrants coming into the EU. After months of member states 
being unable to find a common response to the rising numbers of new arrivals, the 
agreement is considered a breakthrough by many observers. In fact, the agreement 
stands for a broader shift in EU refugee policy, which now focuses on the themes of 
border security, camps and quotas. This goes along with a reorientation from the 
previously prevalent individual asylum application towards a system where groups of 
refugees are accepted voluntarily (resettlement). This trend carries serious risks for 
refugee protection globally. At the same time, however, new forms of cooperation are 
taking shape that could strengthen the EU asylum system. 
 
The sharp rise in the number of asylum 
seekers in late summer 2015 triggered 
centrifugal processes within the EU. The 
Dublin Regulation – under which asylum-
seekers must be registered in the country 
through which they first enter the Euro-
pean Union – was effectively suspended. 
EU member states have failed to implement 
the EU Council of Ministers’ decision to 
resettle a limited number of refugees from 
Italy and Greece, and have resisted the 
introduction of a permanent relocation 
scheme. Instead, the reintroduction of 
(temporary) border controls at several in-
ternal EU borders casts doubt over a core 
achievement of European integration, 
and indicates a worrying tendency towards 
renationalisation. The roots of these develop-
ments are not limited to the rapidly rising 
number of Syrian refugees. They also result 
from well-known deficiencies in the EU 
asylum system and are thus an expression 
of a structural crisis in European politics. 
Shortcomings of the current 
policy framework 
In the past two decades the EU has extended 
the contractual foundations for harmonis-
ing national asylum systems step by step. 
The Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) has been considered complete since 
June 2013. It consists of five core elements: 
the Reception Conditions Directive, Asylum 
SWP Comments 32 
June 2016 
2 
Procedures Directive, Qualification Direc-
tive, Dublin Regulation and Eurodac Regu-
lation. The three directives define legally 
binding minimum standards for the recep-
tion and care of asylum seekers, the pro-
cessing of their asylum applications and 
the granting of refugee status. On paper 
these legal instruments guarantee uniform 
procedures and a uniform protection 
status across the EU. In practice, however, 
member states’ procedural standards and 
recognition rate for asylum seekers diverge 
as much as ever. In addition, the approval 
of an asylum application – unlike its rejec-
tion – is not initially valid across the whole 
of the EU. Choosing the EU member state 
in which to make their first application for 
asylum therefore continues to be of decisive 
importance to asylum seekers.  
Against that backdrop, the Dublin System 
has two serious weaknesses. First, it saddles 
the EU member states with external bor-
ders with a disproportionately large share 
of responsibility. Second, it is continuously 
being undermined by asylum seekers who 
try to avoid being registered until they have 
reached a destination country within the 
EU that is attractive for them.  
These structural deficits have long been 
evident. For years, EU member states ne-
glected to develop fundamental alternatives 
to the Dublin System, except for gradual 
reforms. Only since the dramatic rise in the 
number of asylum applications have heads 
of state and government made room on 
their agendas for a model using quotas for 
the fair allocation of asylum seekers. 
Political reactions 
To remedy these weaknesses, the EU Com-
mission has proposed far-reaching reforms 
to its asylum and migration policy. In May 
2015, in response to two devastating boat 
accidents in the Mediterranean, it issued 
the “European Agenda on Migration”. This 
agenda entails measures aimed at protect-
ing external borders and reducing irregular 
migration alongside a reform of the Dublin 
System and the expansion of legal means of 
migration.  
As one step towards fulfilling this com-
prehensive agenda, EU member states 
agreed in autumn 2015 to relocate 160,000 
asylum seekers located in Italy and Greece. 
However, the implementation of this emer-
gency relocation scheme foundered because 
of the resistance of several EU member 
states, including Slovakia, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. Moving forward on meas-
ures aimed at reducing the number of new 
arrivals has proved to be easier. Due to this, 
three key themes have dominated the Euro-
pean debate on asylum and refugee policy 
over the past few months: border security, 
camps and quotas. 
Border security 
Attempts to impose stricter controls on the 
EU’s external borders are far from new. 
They have always constituted the counter-
part to the EU’s internal freedom of move-
ment. These two aspects are also linked in 
the current crisis: the growing restriction 
of free movement within the EU – through 
the reintroduction of controls at internal 
borders and the temporary closures of some 
of those borders – went along with demands 
for an improved protection of the EU’s 
external borders. Over the past few years, 
the EU border control agency Frontex, 
established on 1 May 2005, has been con-
tinuously expanded. Since its inception, 
the number of staff it employs has grown 
more than tenfold, and its annual budget 
has risen from six to 254 million euros.  
In the context of the current refugee 
crisis, Frontex has been equipped with 
additional resources, and its mandate has 
been broadened. Frontex is now authorised 
to initiate returns without having to wait 
for member state initiatives. The “EU Action 
Plan on Return”, adopted in September 
2015, stipulates the creation of an inde-
pendent Frontex Return Office and a series 
of Rapid Return Intervention Teams under 
Frontex leadership. 
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On the whole, member states are in 
favour of expanding the agency into a 
“European border and coast guard agency” 
with even greater independence. This may, 
however, fall short of the EU Commission’s 
far-reaching proposal to allow for deploy-
ment of the agency without the agreement 
of the respective member state when 
necessary. 
Stepping up border security is often justi-
fied by the need to put a stop to migrant 
smugglers. The main purpose of Operation 
Sophia (formerly EU NAVFOR Med) is to 
fight people-smuggling in the Mediterra-
nean. Since February 2016, a NATO deploy-
ment in the Aegean Sea – in which Turkey 
and Greece cooperate with each other – has 
been pursuing the same goal. Efforts are 
also being made to improve border surveil-
lance technology. The EU Commission has 
demanded a better implementation of the 
border surveillance system EUROSUR that 
was introduced in 2013. This system is in-
tended to support border security through 
the use of drones, high-resolution cameras 
and satellite tracking systems, and to sim-
plify the exchange of information between 
member states. Finally, a Commission 
proposal aims at reforming the Schengen 
Borders Code so as to improve and facilitate 
the exchange and matching of biometric 
data collected at the EU’s external borders.  
Camps 
Along with the reinforced security on exter-
nal borders, centralised forms of refugee 
accommodation play an ever greater role in 
the EU’s refugee policy. The various facets 
of the debate can be grouped together under 
the keyword “camps”, although the respec-
tive forms and objectives diverge sharply 
depending on context. 
First, many member states are setting 
up city-level or municipal reception centres 
for refugees. EU member states faced with 
large numbers of new asylum seekers have 
created centralised reception facilities so as 
to be able to register, provide for and look 
after a large number of individuals in a 
short time. Some member states have resi-
dence requirements that compel refugees 
to remain in such reception facilities. These 
requirements are often linked to debates 
about the advantages and disadvantages of 
centralised versus decentralised accommo-
dation and the repercussions they have on 
refugees being accepted and integrated in 
society. 
A second type of camp is located inside 
EU member states and close to their borders. 
Some member states with high refugee 
numbers have set up reception camps to 
speed up identification of those who do not 
need protection – and to speed up their 
returns as well. The German government, 
for instance, has created two so-called 
reception and return centres in Bavaria for 
asylum seekers whose prospects of being 
accepted are slim. 
A third type of camp is used for directing 
and ordering the migration flows within 
Europe. Whilst the so-called EU hotspots are 
intended to facilitate the agreed re-alloca-
tion of 160,000 asylum seekers currently 
stranded in Italy and Greece, the “transit 
centres” established in November 2015 along 
the Balkan route will be used to direct mi-
grants’ onward journey north into more 
orderly channels.  
A fourth type of camp is located outside 
of the EU. Here, two aspects must be taken 
into account. First, EU member states have 
a long history of supporting refugee camps 
operated by the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees or by national actors 
in states bordering on the crisis areas – in 
the case of the Syrian war, in Lebanon, Jor-
dan and Turkey. Despite countless appeals 
by international aid organisations, the EU 
did not realise how insufficient this support 
was until the drastic rise in onward migra-
tion by Syrian and other refugees from 
Turkey. Now, appeals tend to be listened to 
more: at a big international donor confer-
ence for supporting Syria’s neighbouring 
countries in February 2016, the states in-
volved pledged a total of 11 billion US 
dollars’ worth of aid. This sum is also meant 
to improve conditions in the camps.  
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The second aspect concerns extra-terri-
torial refugee camps. Those in favour of 
such camps argue that decisions on asylum 
applications ought to be taken outside of 
the EU – for instance, along the African 
transit routes or in North African states. 
They hope that using such camps will make 
it easier to direct migration flows. There is 
also currently a debate about establishing 
extraterritorial camps in a pacified zone in 
Syria – a proposal that raises far-reaching 
questions of foreign and security policy. 
These conceptions and discussions of the 
role that camps play in EU refugee policy 
differ greatly both conceptually and in the 
degree to which they have been realised. 
To summarise and simplify, the picture 
that emerges is one of concentric circles. 
The innermost circle consists of the camps 
located in member state towns and munici-
palities; the second circle of the new facil-
ities in member states’ border regions. The 
third circle is made up of the hotspots and 
transit centres in EU states with external 
borders and along the Balkan route; and 
the fourth circle consists of the existing and 
planned refugee camps outside the EU, the 
latter for instance in North Africa and Syria. 
How one evaluates the various types of 
camp depends on fundamental questions. 
Are they open or closed facilities? For how 
long are refugees expected to stay there? 
Is this where (preliminary) decisions regard-
ing asylum seekers’ need for protection are 
taken? Who has the authority to take such 
decisions, and what guarantees are there 
that they will respect the legal avenues as 
stipulated? And finally: are the camps used 
to arrange returns? 
What one needs to bear in mind is that 
camps can easily become detention centres. 
One example is the hotspots in Greece, 
which had originally been conceived as open 
camps. However, they are now meant to en-
sure that the EU-Turkey agreement is imple-
mented and have thus been repurposed as 
closed facilities.  
Quotas 
Quotas are the third major theme in 
current European refugee policy. In recent 
months, several member states have called 
for clearly defined upper limits to the num-
ber of refugees being received. The German 
government has declined to set such limits 
on ground of international law, constitu-
tional law and practicality. In February 
2016, the Austrian government defined an 
upper limit for refugee reception, and 
linked this to daily quotas for processing 
asylum applications. While the legal ex-
perts tasked with evaluating these upper 
limits declared the measure to be unconsti-
tutional, the foray quickly had an impact. 
As many observers had predicted, there was 
a domino effect of border closures along 
the Balkan route. This has created a backlog 
of asylum seekers at the Greece-Macedonia 
border. 
Simultaneously, a discussion unfolded 
on the resettlement of Syrian refugees from 
Turkey. While the US, Canada and Australia 
have a tradition of accepting refugees as 
part of the UNHCR resettlement programme, 
European states used not to participate in 
the programme at all or only very hesitantly.  
However, Germany has gained experience 
outside the UNHCR resettlement process, 
in the context of humanitarian admission 
programmes for refugees from Iraq in 2008 
and in recent years from Syria. Since 2013, 
almost 42,000 Syrians who had fled the 
civil war to neighbouring countries have 
been received in Germany through three 
federal and fifteen state-level programmes. 
The Federal Government, however, has 
not launched any further reception pro-
grammes because other EU member states 
lacked the willingness to follow this ap-
proach, and because in 2015 refugee num-
bers rose sharply. 
In view of the many casualties in the 
Mediterranean Sea, and the inability of EU 
member states to agree on the relocation 
of refugees within the EU, the ordered re-
settlement of refugees now seems an attrac-
tive alternative to uncontrolled migration 
across the Mediterranean. Turkey, currently 
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the main transit country for refugees travel-
ling to the EU, is the EU’s most important 
partner in this.  
The EU-Turkey agreement of 18 March 
2016 marks the highpoint of these develop-
ments so far. From a European perspective 
the crux of the agreement is the quick re-
turn of rejected asylum seekers and irregu-
lar immigrants from Greece into Turkey. In 
return for every Syrian refugee sent back to 
Turkey, one vulnerable person is supposed 
to be resettled from a Turkish refugee camp 
to an EU member state. However, this “one 
in, one out” rule only applies up to a limit 
of 72,000 people, and the participation of 
individual EU member states in the resettle-
ment process is voluntary. In addition, the 
agreement with Turkey also secures quick 
progress on visa liberalisation, a revival of 
Turkey’s EU accession negotations and ex-
tensive financial aid for providing support 
to refugees.  
Since the agreement came into effect on 
20 March 2016, newly arriving refugees in 
Greece have been detained in the “hotspots”. 
Since information spreads rapidly among 
refugees, these deterrent measures are 
having their first effect: the number of new 
arrivals on the Greek Islands has dropped 
by 80% in the first three weeks of the agree-
ment being in force. Where previously an 
average of 1,676 refugees had arrived in 
Greece every day since the beginning of the 
year, the post-agreement average was only 
337. While this solution reduces the politi-
cal pressure on decision-makers, there are 
doubts over its sustainability in the long 
run. As the cooperation between the EU and 
Turkey shows, the dynamics of reinforced 
borders, camps and quotas will shape EU 
refugee policy in the future. However, 
there are serious risks associated with such 
policies.  
Risks 
In recent months, strong political pressure 
has been brought to use the EU-Turkey 
agreement as a lever to help generate Euro-
pean consensus on the way forward in the 
refugee crisis. Progress in cooperating with 
Turkey was particularly important for the 
German government, which had argued 
vehemently against national unilateralism 
and for a European solution, so as to reduce 
the number of refugees reaching Europe. 
The pressure to act and the high hopes for 
an effective agreement have created a situa-
tion in which no critical analysis of the 
risks in terms of human rights, internation-
al law and foreign policy has yet been 
carried out. 
The detention of asylum seekers in 
Greece raises human rights concerns. It is 
not clear whether asylum seekers in the 
closed facilities are granted sufficient legal 
assistance or the possibility of appealing 
against negative decisions. It is equally 
unclear how long they will be detained. 
Greece adopted a law on 1 April 2016 that 
reconciles the return of refugees to Turkey 
with its obligations under international 
and EU law. Under the Greek law, asylum 
seekers may be returned to Turkey if they 
can be guaranteed sufficient protection 
there. Whether or not Turkey meets the 
conditions for this is a highly controversial 
point. Some legal analyses have based them-
selves on the Turkish asylum law in force 
since 2013 to declare the planned returns 
legal. However, they focus exclusively on 
the legal position and pay no attention to 
the inadequate implementation of the law. 
UNHCR continues to rate Turkey’s capac-
ities in asylum policy as insufficient. While 
there is broad consensus that Syrian war 
refugees are given an appropriate level of 
protection in Turkey, reports by critical 
human-rights organisations document many 
illegal expulsions of Afghan nationals. In 
recent months, there have also been in-
creasing reports of illegal push-backs at the 
Turkish-Syrian border.  
The EU has made far-reaching conces-
sions to Turkey in the current agreement, 
revealing the relationship of dependency 
that has been created by the de-facto out-
sourcing of border controls and responsibil-
ity for asylum seekers to third states. When 
the EU gives top priority to keeping away 
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larger refugee movements, this weakens its 
negotiating position vis-à-vis third states. In 
particular, the EU’s neighbours to the south 
are quite capable of allowing refugees to 
cross the Mediterranean or else preventing 
them from doing so. This gives them sub-
stantial negotiating power. Furthermore, 
a reduction in the number of refugees 
reaching the EU does not per se lead to an 
actual reduction in refugee movements. 
Rather, it results in a displacement of refu-
gees to other states and thus inevitably 
places a greater burden on those states. This 
can lead to conflicts – for instance, between 
refugees and locals over scarce resources – 
and affects the security of host countries. 
The lack of prospects in the camps can then 
lead to radicalisation or to the camps being 
misused for recruiting fighters. 
What emerges is a turn away from indi-
vidual asylum applications on European 
territory and towards the reception of “pre-
sorted” refugees as part of resettlement 
quotas. This generates internal EU conse-
quences as well as foreign-policy and secu-
rity-policy risks. On the one hand, a regula-
ted resettlement system with transparent 
selection criteria can strengthen the public’s 
acceptance of refugees. On the other hand, 
the distinction between “legitimate” and 
“illegitimate” refugees may be re-empha-
sized. There is already greater understand-
ing for Syrian civil-war refugees than for 
most other groups of asylum seekers, even 
if they are fleeing from political persecu-
tion. Such a one-sided focus on situations 
of acute civil war risks upstaging the pro-
tection needs of individuals from other 
countries, who suffer political persecution.  
Moreover, solutions based on quotas 
facilitate the de-facto introduction of upper 
limits for receiving refugees. The more the 
focus shifts from individual entries to re-
settlement quotas, the easier it becomes to 
enforce upper limits. That would suit advo-
cates of a restrictive refugee policy. 
In the final analysis, evaluating the risks 
associated with fortified borders, camps 
and reception quotas depends on their 
respective design. The example of resettle-
ment programmes makes this particularly 
clear. Does the state concerned commit 
itself to receiving additional refugees? Or is 
it a case – as in the EU-Turkey agreement – 
of offsetting direct irregular arrivals against 
refugees being resettled in a controlled man-
ner? How many places are being offered? 
And what is the relationship between that 
number, the number of resettlement places 
required and the capacities of the reception 
country? What are the criteria for selecting 
refugees? Will EU member states have to 
commit themselves to permanently pro-
viding a certain number of resettlement 
places, or will quotas be expanded or re-
duced according to the political situation? 
The answers to these questions will decide 
whether resettlement plays a major part in 
refugee protection, or whether the states 
involved misuse limited resettlement quotas 
as a means of freeing themselves from any 
further humanitarian responsibility.  
Ultimately, the emerging shift in focus 
in the EU’s refugee policy also contains 
risks for refugee protection at a global level. 
The design of the global refugee system, 
which is based on international law and 
protected by the UNHCR, depends not only 
on the contents of the Geneva Convention 
on Refugees but also on state practice. 
European states used to be important role 
models in this regard, which served as a 
basis of their credibility in promoting refu-
gee protection in other countries. If that 
status is lost, the implications will reach 
beyond Europe. Potentially, they could even 
trigger onward migration of refugees from 
their country of first reception into the EU. 
The building blocks of a 
sustainable EU refugee policy  
Despite the risks, the current policy also 
offers opportunities. First, the EU-Turkey 
agreement has reduced refugee numbers 
for the moment, which lessens internal 
political pressure towards national uni-
lateralism, at least temporarily. This could 
create a new window of opportunity at the 
European level. Second, in recent months 
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new forms of technical cooperation have 
developed between EU member states that 
would have been hard to imagine some 
time ago. For instance, not only do border 
protection officers already cooperate on-
site, but judges and asylum decision-makers 
from other EU states are also expected to 
be deployed to facilities in Greece to ensure 
that asylum applications can be made in 
accordance with European and internation-
al law. These approaches are necessary to 
support Greece in the current situation. 
They will also help to strengthen the Greek 
asylum system in the long run. Last but 
not least, they have a confidence-building 
role and could play an important part in 
creating joint EU asylum procedures.  
The EU Commission pursued this ap-
proach in its communication of 6 April 
2016, in which it proposed upgrading the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) to 
a decision-making authority responsible for 
asylum procedures. By combining asylum-
policy capacities, so the Commission argued, 
asylum procedures could be improved and 
their costs reduced. The EU Commission 
also aims at a comprehensive reform of the 
Dublin Regulation, so as to establish a 
mechanism for relocating asylum seekers 
in times of crisis. Should efforts to get all 
EU states to agree fail, then initially a “coa-
lition of the willing” could commit to such 
a relocation scheme. 
In any case, building sustainable support 
structures requires a political dialogue 
about the social conditions for receiving 
refugees that exist in different EU member 
states. Such a dialogue should form the 
basis for developing flexible steps towards 
integration, so that towns and municipali-
ties with a greater readiness for taking in 
refugees can notify the EU of any spare 
capacity. To encourage the relocation of 
refugees within member states, the EU 
Commission should launch a pilot project 
that offers municipalities receiving addi-
tional refugees financial incentives which 
noticeably exceed the costs that actually 
incur. 
The substantial commitment shown by 
citizens in some member states should also 
be taken into account more, for instance by 
following the Canadian example and offer-
ing private individuals and charities the 
opportunity of financing the reception of 
additional refugees. 
Finally, the relationship between forced 
displacement and migration must be ex-
amined more closely. If options for legal 
migration are expanded, this could prevent 
migrants whose primary motives are eco-
nomic from being an additional burden on 
asylum systems. It would also make sense 
to extend the opportunities for safe passage 
for refugees, so as to discourage them from 
engaging in dangerous irregular migration. 
Resettlement must play a central role in 
this, along with reuniting families, arrang-
ing vocational training or jobs, and the 
option of applying for asylum in EU em-
bassies abroad. Existing resettlement pro-
grammes should therefore be extended and 
consolidated, but they can only ever be a 
building block in a more comprehensive EU 
refugee policy.  
Even though these measures can strength-
en refugee protection in the EU, external 
cooperation will also be needed, consider-
ing the refugee movements that can be 
expected in the future. Europe’s neighbour-
ing countries, as well as its partner coun-
tries in development cooperation in other 
parts of the world, must be supported in 
hosting refugees. This includes using classic 
development-cooperation tools, but also 
purposefully establishing asylum systems 
that offer protection in accordance with the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention on 
Refugees. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 2016 
All rights reserved 
These Comments reflect  
the author’s views. 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute for 
International and  
Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 
10719 Berlin 
Telephone  +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax  +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
Translation by Tom Genrich 
(English version of 
SWP-Aktuell 30/2016) 
